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The Impact of Farm Income Support on Absolute Inequality 
 
Paul Allanson1
 
This paper focuses on the impact of agricultural support policies on the distribution of farming 
incomes, using measures to characterise and quantify the redistributive effects that are based 
on the change in the absolute Gini index.  The provision of support to Scottish agriculture is 
found to have been at best ineffective as a means to reduce the average size of income 
disparities between farms.  Agricultural policy is further shown to have been inefficient as a 
redistributive tool because of the adverse distributional effect of the re-ranking of farms 
induced by the provision of support. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The improvement of the income position of farm households is a prominent if poorly 
defined objective of agricultural policy in many countries.  However the impact of farm 
support programmes on the distribution of income among individual farm households has 
received little explicit consideration in the agricultural economics literature.  Ahearn et al. 
(1985) and Keeney (2000) amongst others have analysed the contribution of farm support 
programmes to the total inequality of agricultural incomes through the decomposition of the 
Gini coefficient by income components, but do not thereby provide a formal characterisation 
of the redistributive properties of farm support programmes per se.  The conventional wisdom 
on the subject is summarised in OECD (2003) which argues that farm support measures do 
not change the income distribution in any significant way because farm support measures are 
still primarily based on production or production factors.  Moreover the generic nature of 
many measures implies that the bulk of support goes to farm households who do not need it.  
OECD agricultural ministers (OECD 1998) have identified equity and targeting as operational 
criteria for policy evaluation. 
In general terms, the redistributive effect of agricultural policy may be defined as the 
difference between the inequality of pre-support and post-support farm household incomes.  
However, the choice of inequality measure for this purpose is constrained by the incidence of 
negative farm incomes or losses, because many standard aggregative measure of inequality are 
either undefined for negative incomes (Amiel et al. 1996) or, if defined, do not give rise to 
well-behaved measures of redistribution if pre-support incomes are negative on average.  
Allanson (2004) seeks to overcome the latter problem by proposing a measure of 
redistributive effect that is defined as the difference between the absolute values of the 
(ordinary) Gini coefficients of pre-support and post-support income.  This paper employs an 
alternative measure equal to the difference between the absolute Gini indices of pre-support 
and post-support incomes.  This measure has the appealing property that a universal flat-rate 
payment scheme will be deemed distributionally neutral and, moreover, it may be 
decomposed to show how the distribution and scale of support determine the redistributive 
effect given the distribution of pre-support income.   
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section introduces the measures that are 
used to characterise and quantify the redistributive effects of agricultural policy.  Section 3 
sets up the empirical application by considering the data issues involved in the construction of 
the distributions of both pre-support and post-support Scottish farming incomes.  Section 4 
presents the empirical findings which relate to the effects of agricultural policy on both the 
inequality and stability of Scottish farming incomes over the period 1993/94 to 1999/00.  The 
final section offers a summary and some brief concluding remarks in the light of the empirical 
findings. 
 
 
2  MEASUREMENT OF REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS  
 
 
Following the approach taken by Musgrave and Thin (1948) the redistributive effect 
of agricultural policy may be defined as the difference between the inequality of pre-support 
and post-support farm household incomes.  But the measurement of this effect poses a 
methodological problem because of the incidence of negative farm incomes or losses.  Losses 
have often been treated as nuisance items in agricultural income distribution studies with one 
common practice being to set all negative incomes to zero even though this will obviously 
bias resultant measures of inequality (Schutz 1950).  However, negative incomes can not 
credibly be ignored in the analysis of the redistributive impact of agricultural policy given that 
many farms would record losses were it not for the provision of support and pre-support farm 
incomes may also be negative on average.   
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Amiel et al. (1996) note many standard aggregative measure of inequality are simply 
undefined for negative incomes.  But even those inequality measures that are defined for both 
positive and negative incomes may not give rise to well-behaved measures of redistribution if 
pre-support incomes are negative on average.  In particular, relative inequality measures such 
as the (ordinary) Gini coefficient G, the relative mean deviation and the coefficient of 
variation, are not suitable for this purpose because the sign of this type of measure is 
determined by the sign of average income.  Thus if average pre-support income is negative 
whereas average post-support income is positive then the resultant measure of redistribution 
will be negative irrespective of the effect of support on inequality (see Allanson 2004, for 
further discussion).   
One solution to this problem is to base the analysis on a measure of absolute 
inequality such as the absolute Gini index or one of the Kolm (1976a, 1976b) family of 
indices.  Absolute inequality measures have the appealing property for the study of farm 
support programmes that they are invariant to equal absolute changes to all incomes.  Thus a 
universal flat-rate payment scheme, which may be deemed to be distributionally neutral in the 
sense that all farms receive the same level of support regardless of pre-support incomes, will 
have no effect on absolute inequality.  In contrast, relative inequality measures are scale 
invariant such that a policy which increases all incomes in the same proportion will be 
deemed to have no redistributive effect.  But the presumed proportionality of benefits is 
precisely the basis of the widespread criticism of existing farm support programmes as poorly 
targeted and inequitable (see, inter alia, OECD 2003, Commission of the European 
Communities 1991a, European Commission 2002, Oxfam 2004).  The absence of a change in 
relative inequality does not therefore provide a particularly appropriate benchmark of 
distributional neutrality for the analysis of the redistributive effects of agricultural policy.  
Accordingly, let R be an index of the overall redistributive effect of farm income 
support defined as the difference between the absolute Gini indices of pre-support and post-
support income, A0 and A1 respectively.  The absolute Gini index A is equal to the average 
absolute difference between all distinct pairs of incomes in the population,2 but may more 
usefully be defined as the product of the (ordinary) Gini coefficient and average income.  In 
particular, the latter definition suggests a decomposition of R into ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
components along the lines of Kakwani (1984):  
 
(1) R = A0  – A1 = [ 0y G0 
 – 1y C1] + 1y [C1 – G1] =
  V + H  
 
where G0 and G1 are the (ordinary) Gini coefficients of pre-support and post-support income, 
0y  and 1y  are the corresponding mean incomes, and C1 is the concentration index obtained 
when post-support incomes are ranked by pre-support income.1  The ‘vertical’ component V = 
[ 0y G0 
 – 1y C1] = – Cb b  provides a measure of the effects of differences in mean policy 
benefits between farms with different levels of pre-support income, which in turn depends on 
the distribution and scale of policy benefits where Cb is the concentration coefficient of 
benefits ranked by pre-support income3 and b is the mean level of benefits.  Let D = – Cb be a 
disparity index that is positive (negative) if support is progressive (regressive) in absolute 
terms such that mean benefit levels are a decreasing (increasing) function of pre-support 
income, and that equals zero if the benefit schedule is uniform.  For any given D, the gross 
redistributive effect of the policy will be proportional to the average level of benefits b .  
However, the index of gross redistributive effect V overstates the redistributive impact of the 
provision of support because it includes the effects of changes in the ranking of farms between 
the pre-support and post-support income distributions that have no effect on overall 
inequality.  The ‘horizontal’ component H = 1y [C1 – G1] measures these re-ranking effects 
and is equal to the product of mean post-support income 1y  and the re-ranking index [C1 – 
G1] of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981).  H is non-positive by definition, implying that 
any re-ranking that does occur has a negative impact on the overall redistributive effect of the 
programme.  
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The indices R, V and H may be given a normative interpretation with reference to the 
welfare measure W= ( ) AyG1y −=−  of Sen (1973).  Letting W1 be welfare in the post-
support income distribution and WE be welfare under a hypothetical policy of uniform benefits 
equal in total value to the actual support programme, then 
 
(2) W1 − WE = R = V + H. 
 
Thus R, V and H can be interpreted as the monetary value of the redistributive effects of the 
policy expressed on an individual farm basis.  In particular, A represents how much more or 
less would have to be given to each farmer under the distributionally neutral policy of uniform 
benefits to yield a welfare level equal to that under the actual support programme.  Note that 
the (negative) re-ranking term H takes away from any welfare superiority of the actual benefit 
schedule over a distributionally neutral one.  
 
 
3  DATA  
 
 
To assess the redistributive effects of the provision of agricultural support in Scotland 
over the period 1993/94 to 1999/00, the distribution of farms by both pre-support and post-
support farming income is constructed for each year using individual farm record data 
extracted from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) and raising factors calculated from 
the June Agricultural Census returns on the distribution of agricultural holdings in Scotland 
by type of farming and size of business.  The FAS is a representative survey of about 500 full-
time commercial farms carried out each year on behalf of the Scottish Executive (SEERAD 
2001).  It provides a wide range of physical and financial data, including detailed information 
on crop areas, livestock numbers, quotas, production, sales, revenues, subsidies and costs, 
which allows for the identification of policy benefits.  Given a population of around 17,500 
full-time farms in Scotland, the sampling fraction for each farm size and type is approximately 
3 per cent.4
Post-support income is measured by Family Farm Income (FFI), which represents the 
return to the farm’s own capital and all unpaid labour (farmers and spouses, non-principal 
partners and directors and their spouses and family workers) based on the actual tenure and 
indebtedness of the farm business.  FFI is thus a measure of farm business income with the 
distribution of FFI per holding providing ‘an important guide to the existence and locations of 
holdings generating small amounts of income for their occupiers’ (Hill 1991: 43).  The 
analysis is conducted at the farm level rather than per unit of unpaid labour because of doubts 
concerning the relevance and reliability of data on family labour input in the UK context (see 
Hill 1991).  The FAS does not provide sufficient information on either non-farm sources of 
farm household income or farm household composition to support a broader analysis of the 
distributional impact of farm income support on the overall welfare of the agricultural 
community.   
Pre-support income is defined as FFI less that part of gross policy transfers that is 
estimated to accrue to farm occupiers as owners of factors of agricultural production.  This 
approach recognises that farm occupiers may not be the ultimate beneficiaries of farm support 
programmes (Floyd 1965) and, in particular, allows for the effective incidence of support to 
vary depending on the way in which that support is provided (see OECD 2003: Part II).  The 
analysis thereby serves to identify the contribution of support to the inequality of post-support 
farming incomes, but it does not allow for the impact of agricultural policy on the distribution 
of pre-support incomes.  To do so would require a model of the impact on individual farm 
incomes of adjustments in both farm production choices and the state of agricultural input and 
output markets in response to agricultural policy changes.  However it seems unlikely that the 
results of such an equilibrium displacement modelling exercise would be robust given the 
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magnitude of the changes that would be entailed by the complete abolition of support for 
agriculture (Gardner 1987).  
Three types of policy instrument are identified in the analysis.  First, with respect to 
market price support measures, estimates are taken from the OECD PSE database (OECD 
2001) of the gap between the EU domestic market and border prices for the main agricultural 
commodities, measured at the farmgate level.  These estimates are adjusted to reflect the 
difference between United Kingdom (UK) and EU average producer prices and then used to 
calculate the impact of market price support in terms of inflating both the value (net of direct 
payments, grants and other subsidies) of observed output quantities and the cost of purchased 
feed and seed inputs.  Second, direct payments are explicitly identified in the FAS and cover 
payments under the various Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) commodity regimes, 
voluntary set-aside schemes and the UK Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances scheme.  
But account is also taken of the implicit loss in revenues resulting from the obligatory set-
aside requirements under the Arable Area Payments scheme (AAPS) in calculating the net 
value of these payments.  Third, the value of other grants and subsidies includes all other 
payments to farmers except for those in respect of permanent improvements.  
The net economic benefit to farmers of these transfers will depend on the extent to 
which the transfers result in increased returns to the farm-owned factors of production, 
including management, and hence in increased farming incomes.  The effect on farming 
income of a unit increase in output revenues, whether due to market price support, output 
payments or a reduction in set-aside requirements, is estimated as the combined cost share of 
the farm-owned factors of production, while that of a unit increase in direct payments, grants 
or subsidies to individual inputs (i.e. land and livestock) is simply calculated as the farm-
owned share of those inputs.  Estimates of factor cost shares are obtained on the assumption 
that Scottish agriculture may be characterised by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production 
technology exhibiting constant returns to scale.  Allowing for fixed farm-specific and year-
specific effects, the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production function are estimated from 
an unbalanced panel of observations formed from the FAS samples for 1995/96 through 
1999/00 (Roberts et al. 2002).  This yields shares for total labour, land and buildings, 
livestock capital, and all other purchased inputs of 15.2%, 9.5%, 8.6%, and 41.4% 
respectively.  With these attributable costs accounting for 74.8% of total revenue, the residual 
25.2% is identified as the return to the farmer’s (fixed) management input.  Farm-owned 
shares of factors of production are derived for each farm in the FAS sample, with 78.7% of 
labour, 58.1% of land and buildings and 100% of livestock capital being supplied on average 
by farm occupiers in the full raised sample.  Hence the average net benefit to farmers of an 
extra £1 of market price support or output-related payments; AAPS or other area-related 
payments; livestock headage payments, subsidies or grants; and purchased input subsidies 
would have been £0.513, £0.581, £1 and £0 respectively. 
 
 
4  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
This section presents the empirical findings of the study, which relate to the effects of 
agricultural policy on both the inequality and stability of Scottish farming incomes over the 
period 1993/94 to 1999/00.  Table 1 presents weighted summary statistics by year for Scottish 
agriculture.  Average FFI per farm was positive throughout the period, but fell sharply in 
1997/98 as a result of a marked decline in total output and had not recovered by 1999/00.  In 
contrast, the total value of support was roughly constant in spite of the changing balance of 
support between direct payments and market price support during the phased introduction of 
the MacSharry reforms (Commission of the European Communities 1991b).  Direct payments 
provided the main source of support throughout the period, with 1993/94 marking the start of 
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TABLE 1  Weighted Summary Statistics, 1993/94-1999/00. 
1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
Total farm output 98434 107111 112834 112143 95713 95294 93851
Total farm input 80424 85703 89789 92163 
 
 
 
90893 90445 89903
(Post-support) FFI (£/farm) 23856 27645 28903 26790 11504 11921 11656
% of farms with post-support FFI<0 7% 9% 8% 7% 25% 26% 24%
Total transfers  (£/farm) 35348 37725 39757 38620 36983 40728 40132
Of which due to:-   Market price support 18312 18325 16025 10409 11633 13514 14216
(Net) direct payments 15306 17317 21618 26045 23931 25625 23699
Other grants and subsidies 1730 2082 2114 2167 1419 1589 2217
Total net benefit to farmers (£/farm) 25876 27144 29117 29934 27476 30876 30119
Of which due to:-   Market price support 9855 9742 8504 5341 5923 7132 7637
(Net) direct payments 14436 15492 18787 22874 20446 22493 20724
Other grants and subsidies 1585 1910 1826 1718 1107 1252 1758
As % of post-support FFI: 108% 98% 101% 112% 239% 259% 258%
Pre-support FFI (£/farm) -2020 501 -214 -3144 -15972 -18955 -18464
% of farms with pre-support FFI<0 57% 61% 63% 61% 86% 87% 87%
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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the introduction of the MacSharry reforms and 1995/96 their full implementation.  Market 
price support was also significant with domestic producer prices for most commodities 
remaining well above corresponding world price levels in spite of the reduction in agricultural 
support prices between 1993/94 and 1995/96, though characteristically exhibiting greater 
variability than the other sources of support due to the effects of variation both in output 
levels and in domestic and world market conditions.   
The total value of support exceeded FFI throughout the period, although farmers 
would not in practice have received the full benefit of these transfers due to leakages to other 
owners of factors of agricultural production.  Allowing for these leakages, the total impact of 
agricultural support on average family farm income is estimated to have been between £25000 
and £31000 per year rather than between £35000 and £41000.  Average pre-support incomes 
are thus predicted to have been close to zero in the years up to 1996/97, but to have fallen 
sharply thereafter with losses of more than £15000 recorded in each of the three years 1997/98 
through 1999/00.  The chronic dependence of farming on state aid is highlighted by the 
finding that in no year would less than half of all farms have recorded pre-support losses, and 
nearly 90% would have done so in the latter years of the period. 
Table 2 presents the main findings of the study.  Absolute inequality in post-support 
farm incomes is shown to be substantial with the average income differential between farms 
comparable in size to average income levels in the latter years of the study period.  In 
comparison, the distribution of pre-support income exhibited lower levels of absolute 
inequality prior to 1997/98, but similar levels thereafter.  The provision of support thus 
increased the average size of income differentials prior to 1997/98, as indicated by the 
negative values of the index of net redistributive effect R, but thereafter had a broadly neutral 
effect on absolute inequality with the value of R approximately equal zero.  In the first period, 
the negative redistributive impact of agricultural policy was such as to increase average 
income disparities by between 20 and 30 per cent.  
The first point to note is that the disparity index D is consistently positive, implying 
that farmers with negative or low pre-support incomes received more than an equal share of 
total benefits (although their share of benefits was less than their share of overall losses).  
Hence the index of vertical redistribution V is also consistently positive, implying that 
agricultural policy would have made the distribution of farming income more equal in 
absolute terms had it not been for the adverse distributional effects of re-ranking as measured 
by the index H.  The main change over the period is seen to be the increase in this gross 
positive redistributive effect due to both the increasing scale of average net benefits and the 
changing balance of support measures.  In particular, the partial switch from price support 
measures to direct aid payments is likely to have had a beneficial impact given both the higher 
transfer efficiency and more progressive distribution of the latter.  By the final years of the 
study period, the vertical redistribution effect of agricultural policy had risen to such an extent 
as to almost exactly offset the re-ranking effect.  
The results presented in Table 2 are based on a ‘static’ analysis with the degree of 
inequality and redistribution observed in any particular year influenced not only by 
underlying long-run factors but also by random factors affecting the incomes of individual 
farms in that year.  For example, in the extreme case, the long run income of all farms might 
be equal but, because in each year different farms have good or bad luck, observed farm 
income in each year may be very unequal.  Conversely, the observed inequality may be 
entirely due to differences in permanent income between farms if transitory shocks are 
perfectly correlated across farms.  Clearly, the two scenarios have very different implications 
for the design of agricultural policy with the first calling for short-term assistance to deal with 
transitory problems of low or negative incomes on individual farms and the second requiring 
action to deal with the structural problems that trap some farms in low or negative incomes.   
We consider here the impact of agricultural support policy on the stability of farm 
incomes by exploiting the longitudinal information on individual farms in the FAS panel.  To 
measure the stability of income and support levels, we calculate a stability index in the spirit 
of Shorrocks (1978), which may be defined for any income or support variable X over a 
1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
Absolute Gini index for post-support FFI A1 12089 16791 16015 14473 11397 11931 10950
Absolute Gini index for pre-support FFI A0 9274 14069 12581 11953 11361 13646 11165
Index of redistributive effect R −2815 −2721 −3434 −2520 −36 1715 215
Index of vertical redistribution V 1991 1370 1624 2961 5002 6888 5824
Of which due to:   Market price support -1713 -1521 -1450 -712 -68 404 347
(Net) direct payments 3499 3242 3539 3927 4859 6264 5286
Other grants and subsidies 205 -351 -465 -254 211 220 191
Index of re-ranking    H −4806 −4091 −5058 −5482 −5038 −5173 −5609
Disparity of net benefits:  Total support D 0.077 0.050 0.056 0.099 0.182 0.223 0.193
Market price support −0.174 −0.156 −0.171 −0.133 −0.011 0.057 0.045
(Net) direct payments 0.242 0.209 0.188 0.172 0.238 0.278 0.255
Other grants and subsidies 0.130 −0.184 −0.255 −0.148 0.191 0.176 0.109
Average net benefits:  Total support b 25876 27144 29117 29934 27476 30876 30119
Of which due to:   Market price support 9855 9742 8504 5341 5923 7132 7637
(Net) direct payments 14436 15492 18787 22874 20446 22493 20724
Other grants and subsidies 1585 1910 1826 1718 1107 1252 1758
Average post-support FFI 1y 23856 27645 28903 26790 11504 11921 11656
Atkinson-Plotnick re-ranking index  C1−G1 −0.201 −0.148 −0.175 −0.205 −0.438 −0.434 −0.481
TABLE 2  The Redistributive Effects of Agricultural Support Policy, 1993/94-1999/00 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
measurement period of T years as the ratio of the T-year Absolute Gini index of X, calculated 
using each farm’s average value of X over the T-year period, to the average of the T annual 
values of the Absolute Gini index of X.  The index will equal zero when income or support 
levels are exactly equalised over the measurement period in which case the T-year Absolute 
Gini index is equal to zero, and will equal unity when all absolute income or support 
differentials between individual farms remain constant through time in which case the 
Absolute Gini index for each year and for the measurement period as a whole will be the 
same.  Hence if inequality is largely a short-run phenomenon due to transitory shocks then the 
index will take a value close to zero whereas if inequality largely arises from long-term 
differences between farms then the index will take a value close to unity.5
The stability analysis is restricted to a balanced panel of 336 farms for which FAS 
data are available for all seven of the years 1993/94 to 1999/00.6  Table 3 reports the values of 
the stability index and constituent annual average and T-year absolute Gini indices for the 
various measures of income and support employed in the study over progressively longer 
measurement periods commencing in 1993/94.  The stability indices are seen to all equal unity 
when T=1, since the one-year absolute Gini index is simply the absolute Gini for 1993/94.  In 
all other cases, T-year inequality is less than the average level of annual inequality, due to the 
process of averaging over time, and the values of the indices are less than unity.  Figure 1 
plots the values of the stability indices against T to more clearly illustrate the nature of the 
relationship between them for the different measures of income and support.   
 
 
TABLE 3  Stability of Income and Support Levels, 1993/94-1999/00  
Measurement period 93/94 93/94 
to 
94/95
93/94 
to 
95/96
93/94 
to 
96/97
93/94 
to 
97/98 
93/94 
to 
98/99 
93/94 
to 
99/00
T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Average annual absolute Gini index 
Post-support income 11678 12422 13408 13395 12908 12677 12252
Pre-support income 8057 9242 10107 10382 10356 10809 10733
Total support 9319 9533 9862 10124 10080 10161 10164
Market price support 5794 5802 5690 5483 5279 5129 4995
(Net) direct payments 6420 6469 6906 7414 7484 7728 7793
Other grants & subs. 911 967 972 989 933 907 920
 T-year absolute Gini index 
Post-support income 11678 11627 12344 12130 11377 10912 10389
Pre-support income 8057 8382 9007 9086 8815 9098 8974
Total support 9319 9395 9721 9892 9839 9913 9902
Market price support 5794 5774 5650 5334 5111 4968 4830
(Net) direct payments 6420 6367 6803 7235 7302 7561 7619
Other grants & subs. 911 922 916 920 856 823 831
 Stability Index 
Post-support income 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.85
Pre-support income 1.00 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.84
Total support 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
Market price support 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
(Net) direct payments 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Other grants & subs. 1.00 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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We note first that the stability index for total support does not drop below 0.97 
indicating that the inequality of benefits observed in any one year almost entirely reflects 
permanent differences in eligibility between farms.  The stability of (net) direct payments 
might have been expected given that eligibility for many direct payments is based on quasi-
fixed factors of production and restricted by historical production levels and/or possession of 
relevant quotas.  More surprising is that the distribution of market price support appears no 
less stable over time given that the benefits of market intervention to individual farms will 
have been subject to commodity-specific fluctuations in both output levels and world market 
conditions.  Only the distribution of other grants and subsidy appears to have been subject to 
any significant degree of variability, perhaps due to shifting patterns of participation in a 
changing miscellany of voluntary schemes. 
 
 
FIGURE 1  Stability of income and support measures. 
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The results further suggest that the provision of support stabilises farm incomes to 
some extent given that the stability index for post-support income lies consistently above that 
for pre-support incomes.  In particular, the initial decline in the stability index for post-support 
income is more gradual than that for pre-support income, implying that the support system has 
some capacity to buffer farm incomes from transitory shocks to pre-support incomes.  
Nevertheless, the subsequent convergence of the two stability indices as the measurement 
period increases suggests that the support system does little to remedy the underlying, 
structural determinants of inequality.  Levels of long-run or structural inequality would appear 
to be about 85% of annual inequality, with Table 3 implying a long-run value for the average 
pre-support income differential between farms of roughly £9000.   
 
 10
5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The principal focus of the paper is the measurement of the redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy.  One possible criticism of such an exercise is that the distribution of 
agricultural policy transfers reflects goals other than income support, such as those to do with 
the environment, sustainability and rural development.  However measures specifically 
targeted to these other objectives still only account for a relatively small share of total support, 
whereas the direct payments that were first introduced by the MacSharry reforms of the CAP 
and now account for the bulk of support, had the stated objective of compensating farmers for 
the adverse income effects of cuts in support prices.  The European Commission has for many 
years expressed concerns about the inequitable distribution of income support (Commission of 
the European Communities 1991a, European Commission 1997, 2002) and in the recent Mid 
Term Review of Agenda 2000 made various proposals to improve the targeting of direct 
payments (European Commission 2002, 2003).  
The redistributive effect of agricultural policy is measured as the difference between 
the absolute Gini indices of pre-support and post-support incomes.  This is a measure of the 
change in absolute inequality, which provides a benchmark of distributional neutrality more in 
accord with both public and official perceptions of fairness in the distribution of agricultural 
support than one based on the concept of relative inequality.  The measure has a natural 
interpretation as the change in the average disparity of incomes between farms due to the 
provision of support.  Moreover it may be decomposed into a vertical redistribution effect and 
a horizontal re-ranking component, and thus serves not only to quantify but also to 
characterise the redistributive effect of agricultural policy.   
The measure is used to explore the effects of agricultural policy on the distribution of 
Scottish farm incomes over the period 1993/94 to 1999/00.  It is found that the provision of 
support increased the average size of farm income differentials prior to 1997/98, but thereafter 
had a broadly neutral effect on absolute inequality.  Nevertheless, the vertical stance of 
agricultural policy is shown to have consistently been progressive in absolute terms with the 
average level of benefit decreasing with the level of pre-support incomes.  And it is only 
because of the adverse distributional effects of the re-ranking of farms that the provision of 
income support did not in fact reduce absolute inequality.  Finally, the provision of support 
appears to have buffered farm incomes from the effects of transitory shocks to some extent, 
but does not seem to have remedied the underlying structural factors that are the major cause 
of the inequality observed in any particular year. 
In sum, the operation of agricultural policy in Scotland was at best ineffective as a 
redistributive tool.  This comes as little surprise in the light of the existing literature on the 
subject.  But what is found in this study adds to such conventional wisdom the observation 
that agricultural policy was also inefficient as a redistributive tool because of the negative 
effect of the re-ranking induced by the provision of support.  One likely cause of this 
horizontal inequity is the organisation of the CAP on a commodity basis, with the level of 
support varying across commodities.  However this may not be the main factor given that 
results from a disaggregated analysis by farm type (not reported) show that the re-ranking 
index H for the agricultural sector as a whole is not consistently higher than the comparable 
indices for individual farm types.  Allanson (2005) provides further evidence in support of 
this conclusion.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Paul Allanson is Senior Lecturer, Department of Economic Studies, University of 
Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HN, UK. E-mail: p.f.allanson@dundee.ac.uk.  The author 
acknowledges the financial support of the Scottish Economic Policy Network 
(Scotecon).  He would also like to thank Euan Phimister for the data and Katherine 
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Falconer and Andrew Moxey at SEERAD for authorising its use.  Paper presented to 
the 94th EAAE Seminar on institutional units in agriculture held in Wye, UK, April 9-
10, 2005. 
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1A  where yi is the income of individual i (i=1,…n).   
3. C1 is defined in relation to the concentration curve obtained by plotting the 
cumulative proportion of post-support income against the cumulative proportion of 
the population ranked by pre-support income in the same way that G is defined in 
relation to the ordinary Lorenz curve (see Lambert, 2001).  Note that C1 = G1 if the 
ranking of farms by pre-support and post-support incomes is identical. 
4. The sampling frame excludes very small farms (less than 8 Economic Size Units 
(ESU)), very large specialist livestock units (greater than 200 ESU), and certain minor 
farm types. 
5. Following Shorrocks (1978), it is easy to show that: 
∑∑
==
=≤=
T
1t
t
T
1t
ttTTT AT
1GX
T
1GXA , 
where AT , GT  and TX  are the T-year Absolute Gini index,  Gini coefficient and 
mean value of X respectively, and  At , Gt  and tX  are the corresponding annual 
values in year t.  Hence the stability index must lie in the closed unit interval. 
6. There are 345 farms with data for all seven years.  Of these farms, nine are dropped to 
ensure that the there is no representation of large LFA cattle farms large cereals farms, 
and medium lowland mixed cattle & sheep farms in any year (note that farms may 
change both their size and type over time). 
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